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Does the reduction of the effective tax burden on corporations trigger foreign direct 
investment? We take the German tax reform of 2000 as a natural experiment in order to 
isolate the impact of corporate taxation on the investment of foreign-held affiliates in 
Germany. We do so by exploiting the very rich MiDi data base from the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. Although we deliberately choose an approach which is likely to underestimate 
the tax effects on investment we find significant evidence that the tax reduction had the 
intended effect of - ceteris paribus - fostering inward direct investment. We find an elasticity 
of inward foreign direct investment with respect to the effective marginal tax rate of -0.7. We 
repeat the analysis for different subgroups and find high degrees of heterogeneity. Our results 
do not allow to decide whether the model of discrete investment choices or the model of 
marginal adjustment of the capital stock performs better in explaining the investment data. 
JEL Code: H25, H21. 
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After more than twenty years of empirical research in the relationship between
taxes and foreign direct investment (FDI), there is consensus among most re-
searchers that taxes do matter for the decision of multinational enterprises (MNE)
on where and how much to invest. Correspondingly, policy-makers often rely on
the e⁄ectiveness of corporate tax policy reforms in order to attract FDI, and the
current debate suggests that they will continue to do so in the future. But, lower-
ing the tax burden on investment necessarily implies a cut in public expenditure
or a shift of the tax burden to other tax bases like e.g. labor or consumption.
Therefore, it is necessary not only to know whether taxes do matter but also how
much they do. In other words, the quantitative dimension of the tax impact on
FDI is decisive for the design of sound tax policy which carefully weighs the bene-
￿ts of a corporate tax reduction to the economy as a whole against the cost.1 The
question is: How much additional investment or production do we get for a given
loss of tax revenue?
The purpose of this paper is to measure the elasticity of FDI with respect
to corporate tax reductions. We do so by analyzing the e⁄ect of the German
tax reform in 2000, which came into force in January 2001. This reform implied
substantial corporate tax rate cuts and broadened the corporate tax base. A
frequently cited goal of the tax reform was to attract foreign direct investment in
order to foster economic growth and mitigate the high unemployment rate. Now,
￿ve years after the reform, we ask whether the tax reform reached its goal.
We analyze this question by using the very rich MiDi data set from the Deutsche
Bundesbank with ￿rm-speci￿c balance sheet data of foreign-held companies. Our
analysis contributes to a literature that tries to clarify the incentive e⁄ects of
existing tax systems on corporate investment. As corporate investment is assumed
to be crucial for the generation of new jobs and growth, we think that this question
is at the heart of future debates on corporate tax reforms.
Figure 1 illustrates the increasing importance of cross-border investment. It
shows the inward ￿ ows (left scale) and stocks (right scale) of foreign direct invest-
ment in Europe. As the graph indicates, international foreign direct investment
stocks experienced high - and even exponential - growth rates in the last 25 years.
There were extraordinarily large FDI in￿ ows in the second half of the Nineties and
then a sharp fall from 2001 on. The volatility of the ￿ ows time series hints at the
di¢ culties empirical economists face in isolating the impact of taxes. The German
reform was passed in 2000, when investment had its peak, and came into power in
2001, when FDI - and domestic investment as well - saw a considerable decrease.
1For recent surveys on the theory of capital tax competition see e.g. Wilson and Wildasin
(2004) or Fuest, Huber and Mintz (2005).
1As will become clear in the empirical section of this paper, the task of identifying
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Figure 1: Inward FDI in Europe, ￿ ows and stocks. Source: UNCTAD.
Tax policy is just one environmental condition which may in￿ uence the loc-
ation and investment decision of multinational companies. Other impact factors
are market size, infrastructure, the availability of inputs like well-trained work-
ers, regulatory policy, institutions like property rights, climate etc. There is a
vast literature on the (possible) determinants of FDI, which has been surveyed by
Markusen (1995), Markusen (2002) and Blonigen (2005). Recently, Buch, Klein-
ert, Lipponer and Toubal (2005) analyzed the determinants of German outbound
investment using the same data set as we do in this paper. This study is now con-
sidered the most complete and thorough analysis in the German or even European
context and serves as a qualitative benchmark. Buch et al. (2005) stress the im-
portance of ￿rm heterogeneity which leads to a broad variety of investment motives
and determinants. The strongest predictors for German outward FDI are market
size (positive) and distance (negative), which both cannot be controlled by eco-
nomic policy. However, the authors hint at possible policy implications which are
lowering the barriers to international investment and developing human capital.
Unfortunately, they do not check for the impact of the tax system on FDI ￿ ows
2or stocks. This is in line with the literature which has longtime assumed that tax
policy is of negligible importance to the investment decision.
However, there is a bunch of thorough and methodologically sophisticated pa-
pers on the relationship between taxation and investment which ￿nd strong evid-
ence for the relevance of the tax system. Hines (1999) and Gresik (2001) provide
surveys of these studies related to cross-border investment data. Whereas Hines re-
ports a tax rate elasticity of investment of about ￿0;6, the meta-study by Mooij de
and Ederveen (2003) shows that many studies yield higher results. It is evident,
though, that the quantitative dimension of the results strongly depends on the
quality of the data and the methodological approach used for the empirical ana-
lysis.
In order to isolate the impact of taxation on investment it is necessary to
identify an exogenous variation in the tax parameter which is our explanatory
variable. Apart from seldom and fortunate exceptions like the one described in
Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian (2001), public ￿nance economists do not have
the opportunities of controlled experiments. However, if we assume that tax policy
reforms are exogenous in the sense that they do not depend on periodical vari-
ation in the investment time series, we can interpret tax reforms as ￿natural ex-
periments￿ which allow us to detect the causal relationship between taxes and
investment behavior.2 In the following, we will interpret the major reform of the
corporate tax system of 2000 in Germany as such a natural experiment.
As Hines (1999) points out, ￿(t)he empiricial literature on the e⁄ect of taxes
on FDI considers almost exclusively U.S. data, either the distribution of U.S. dir-
ect investment abroad or the FDI patterns of foreigners who invest in the United
States￿ . This is still true, apart from the recent study by B￿ttner and Ruf (2006)
who use pooled-cross-sectional methods in order to determine the tax e⁄ects on
cross-border location and investment.3 The American dominance is surprising
because the geographical environment of Europe suggests that tax competition
should be ￿ercer among those countries than e.g. between the US and Europe.
The main reason is probably the lack of available and appropriate data sets. The
MiDi data set of the Deutsche Bundesbank can therefore be considered a valuable
source which might help close the gap to the American literature.
2This approach has ￿rst been used in labor economics in the seventies. Auerbach (1991) and
Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994) were among the ￿rst to propose interpreting tax reforms
as natural experiments in order to isolate their impact on business investment. Other studies
using this quasi-experimental approach are Givoly (1992) for the ￿nancial structure, Cummins,
Hassett and Hubbard (1995) for domestic investment and, ￿nally, House and Shapiro (2005) and
Slemrod, Dauchy and Martinez (2005) using the introduction of bonus depreciation.
3There are some papers using European aggregate data, like BØnassy-QuØrØ, FontagnØ and
LahrŁche-RØvil (2005) and St￿whase (2005). From our perspective, these studies di⁄er consider-
ably from those using ￿rm-speci￿c data, as we argue in detail in Becker, Fuest and Hemmelgarn
(2006).
3To the best of our knowledge our paper is the ￿rst which analyzes the tax
impact on FDI using the natural experiment approach with non-US data. In the
next section, we will brie￿ y outline the main features of the German tax reform
in 2000. In section 3, we discuss the main hypothesis - that taxes reduce foreign
direct investment - the estimation approach and some conceptual issues. Section 4
describes the data set and reports the estimation results as well as some robustness
checks. Section 5 concludes.
2 The German tax reform of 2000
The main goals of the German Tax Reform 2000 were to improve the competit-
iveness of ￿rms in Germany, to foster investment, to increase Germany￿ s attract-
iveness to foreign investors and to adapt the corporate tax system to the rules of
the EC common market. With regard to the corporate tax system, the formerly
di⁄erent tax rates on retained earnings (40 percent) and distributed pro￿ts (30
percent) were replaced by a single and lower tax rate on all pro￿ts (25 percent).
In addition, the reform eliminated a long list of loopholes.4
Including local trading taxes (Gewerbesteuer) the combined statutory tax rate
of the old system was 54,3% while the new combined rate is on average 39,4%,
see Spengel (2001). The corporate tax base was broadened substantially. The
rules for thin capitalization of foreign companies and related party ￿nancing were
tightened. Depreciation allowances were reduced in terms of expected value for
tangible assets, like machines, and structures, as is shown in table 1.
Asset type Before 2001 Since 2001
Intangibles
5 years linear deductions
(20%)
5 years of linear deductions
(20%)
Machines
4 years declining balance
(30%), then 3 years linear
deductions (8%)
2 years declining balance
(20%), then 5 years linear
deductions (12,8%)
Structures
25 years linear deductions
(4%)




Table 1: The reform of the tax depreciation allowances.
The decline of the statutory tax rate ensures that both the marginal and the
average e⁄ective tax rate for all assets decrease with the tax reform of 2000. The
tax base broadening for investment in machines and structures, though, leads to a
relative disadvantage for those assets compared to ￿nancial and inventory assets.
4For a complete description of the reform please refer to Keen (2002), Homburg (2000) and
Schreiber (2000).
4Next to the changes in the corporate tax system the reform lowered the top
personal income tax rate and the imputation system for the taxation of dividends
was replaced by a shareholder relief system, the so called half income method (Hal-
beink￿nfteverfahren) which stipulates that 50% of the diovidend after corporate
tax is subject to personal income taxation.
The reform of the personal income tax system and the change in the integration
technique of corporate and shareholder taxation are important and probably rel-
evant for the investment decision of foreign investors. But, as we lack appropriate
data on shareholders, we cannot use these reform features for our purpose. In the
following we will restrict ourselves to the reform of the corporate tax system itself,
but we will discuss in how far the other reform parts might play a role in shaping
the investment process.
3 The theoretical underpinning
This section develops the conceptual framework for our empirical analysis. We
have to de￿ne the nature of decisions that multinational companies make and
that could potentially be distorted by taxation. As pointed out by Devereux and
Gri¢ th (2003), it is helpful to distinguish three dimensions of the investment
decisions of multinational ￿rms: The ￿rst is to decide whether to export or to
produce abroad (internationalization decision). The second decision is where to
produce (location decision). The third decision is how much to produce, or: how
much to invest (investment decision).
Correspondingly, there are two types of tax e⁄ects on FDI. First, taxes may
reduce the average return of a project and thus in￿ uence the internationalization
and location decisions by ￿rms. Second, taxes may change the user cost of capital
and thus have an impact on the investment decision. Our dataset does not to
analyse the internationalization or the location decision of MNEs. We just observe
existing capital stocks and their variation over time. Therefore, our main focus is
on the choice of the optimal capital stock, i.e. the investment decision. However,
discrete jumps in the balance sheet capital stock suggest that we can observe quasi-
location decisions where ￿rms decide to locate the production of new goods in one
country or another. As explained further below, our analysis will therefore take
into account both the marginal and the average tax burden on investment.
53.1 The main hypothesis
Assume that there is an MNE located in a country outside Germany, which has an
a¢ liate in Germany and - potentially - in other countries as well.5 Using a very
general formulation, we can state that the MNE chooses the size of the capital
stocks depending on a ￿nite vector x including global, country-speci￿c, activity-
speci￿c and ￿rm-speci￿c parameters:
￿ = ￿(K1;:::;Kn) with Kh = Kh (xh) (1)
with h = 1;:::;n. The x is a m ￿ 1 vector of parameters which are candidates
for in￿ uencing the investment decision. One of these parameters is supposed to be
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xtax is some tax variable to be operationalized later on. Held everything else
constant, i.e. dxg = 0 8 g 6= tax with g = 1;:::;m, the partial e⁄ect of the tax







Our main hypothesis is that taxation has a negative impact on the foreign-held
capital stock, i.e. ￿tax < 0. There are two channels through which this relation
can be established.
First, consider the case in which taxes increase the cost of capital, and assume
that the pre-tax cost of capital does not depend on country-speci￿c characteristics
but rather on some world capital market. In this case the size of the optimal capital
stock falls because some marginal investment projects are not realized any more.
Here, the capital stock of the foreign parent company and the one of the German
a¢ liate are not systematically linked: i.e.
dKh
dK￿h = 0. Given that the a¢ liate is not
liquidity-constrained, the investment is independent of any factor in￿ uencing the
other a¢ liates, the parent company or their locations characteristics.
Second, if taxes increase the average tax burden of a given project, the probabil-
ity rises that this project will be realized elsewhere, e.g. in the country of residence
of the parent company:
dKh
dK￿h < 0. In this case, the a¢ liate investment depends on
factors in￿ uencing the other capital stocks as well, since they change the relative
5This assumption is justi￿ed by the type of data that we use. We only consider foreign
investors which already have a¢ liates in Germany. Thus, the decision is just how much to invest
and not if at all, i.e. not two-fold like in Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998) or in Razin, Rubinstein
and Sadka (2004).
6attractiveness of the a¢ liate location. These factors include, in particular, foreign
taxes.
Whether FDI are better described by the ￿rst or the second model has consid-
erable policy implications. Sinn (1990) argues that a country can immunize itself
against tax competition by lowering the e⁄ective marginal tax rate to zero and
by only taxing intra-marginal pro￿ts. This is true for the ￿rst model but not for
the second. If ￿rms and/or projects are mobile and not only capital, i.e. if the
second model is valid, there will be no immunization strategy and even the oppos-
ite policy, a tax rate cut cum base broadening strategy, might become optimal, as
is shown in Becker and Fuest (2005). It is one of the objectives of our analysis to
￿nd hints at which of the two distinct models performs better in describing the
empirical investment data.
The literature often di⁄erentiates between cost-driven investment and market-
entry investment, suggesting that the latter are not or only weakly tax-sensitive.
The idea behind this statement is that every unit of a market-entry investment has
some complementary units of production in another country. In this case, the tax
e⁄ect is weaker because domestic taxes only have an impact on the domestic part
of the whole investment. In contrast, cost-driven investment is part of a strategy of
disentangling the production chain. If the goods are not produced in the country
under consideration, they will be produced elsewhere. Proximity to consumers or
market-entry reasoning do not play a role.
In principle, these two types of investment could be used as control and treat-
ment group in order to identify the tax impact on investment. The di¢ culty is
that the data does not directly reveal the type of investment. One often used
approximation is the di⁄erentiation between horizontal investment and vertical
investment, see e.g. Buch et al. (2005). Horizontal (or intra-branch) investment is
supposed to be realized because of market-entry reasons, vertical (or inter-branch)
investment because of cost di⁄erences. As we will outline later on we do not have
any means to di⁄erentiate between these two, either, due to data limitations.
3.2 Identi￿cation problem and estimation approach
As becomes evident from ￿gure 1, there are strong aggregate forces that push
investment up (until 2000) and down (from 2001 on).6 It is therefore helpful
to separate ￿rm-level investment into two parts, an aggregate component and a
6Without taking into account the aggregate impact the analysis could yield contra-intuitive
















Ki;t￿1 where Ki;t is the observable variable ￿ total assets￿of
￿rm i in period t.7 It
Kt￿1 is the aggregate component and Ei;t is the deviation from
the aggregate mean due to ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics. Note that the aggregate
component It
Kt￿1 also includes the aggregate tax e⁄ect in the post-reform years. To
isolate the aggregate tax e⁄ect from other aggregate in￿ uences we would require
data on many tax reforms which allow us identifying some aggregate tax variation
which is orthogonal to the other aggregate variations. For example, Cummins,
Hassett and Hubbard (1994) analyze an investment time series from 1962 to 1988
and observe thirteen signi￿cant changes in the tax system which allow separating
an aggregate tax e⁄ect from other e⁄ects. Another method could be to establish
a reliable empirical structure in times where no tax changes occur and use these
structures in the reform periods. For example, Slemrod, Dauchy and Martinez
(2005) have ten years prior to the introduction of bonus depreciation in order to
estimate the linkage between investment and aggregate variables without any tax
e⁄ect.
We only have one signi￿cant tax variation8, from 2000 to 2001, and our pre-
reform dataset only covers ￿ve years (1996-2000) which proves to be far too little in
order to get this reliable empirical structure. In order to deal with this problem, we
decided to employ a rather radical technique which is to employ a full set of time
dummy variables.9 That is, we cleaned the time series from every time-varying
aggregate e⁄ect, the macroeconomic tax e⁄ect included. If we assume that the
tax reform has a positive e⁄ect on aggregate investment, our estimation results
underestimate the tax impact on investment. In other words, we overestimate the
7That means, we measure net investment Ii;t because for K to be stable over time there have
to be replacement investment. It is true that replacement investment is no automatic process
but a strategic decision which may be in￿ uenced by taxes as well. However, we lack the data to
deal with these questions.
8The decision on what is signi￿cant or not is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. However, the
literature claims unanimously that tax reforms should have a certain amplitude to be interpreted
as a natural experiment. The reason is that unobservable time-varying e⁄ects could otherwise
blur the e⁄ect under consideration. Cummins et al. (1994) enumerate di⁄erent criteria for a tax
reform to be ￿major￿which are met by the German tax reform of 2000.
9We tried di⁄erent methods of detrending the time series by regressing the data on aggregate
consumption, aggregate domestic investment, demand and so on. It turns out that our estimation
results of the tax term are highly sensitive to the detrending method or the detrending variable,
respectively. By choosing the ￿ conservative￿method of employing time dummies we want to
make sure that our results are not the outcome of some spurious correlation with some aggregate
variable.
8aggregate e⁄ect, given that the tax e⁄ect of an e⁄ective tax reduction is de￿nitely
positive. Thus, we will get a conservative (in the sense of biased downwards)
measure of the tax impact on foreign direct investment.






￿tY EARt + ui;t (5)
where the variable Y EARt is a time dummy which is equal to 1 if the year
is equal to t and 0 otherwise. The ￿t-e⁄ect which sums up all aggregate e⁄ects
of one year is equal for all ￿rms. We then compute the di⁄erence between actual







^ ￿tY EARt (6)
where ^ ￿t is the estimated value of ￿t. Even major reforms do not have observ-
able e⁄ects in the reform year if they were expected before. Therefore, we have
to assume that the tax reform comes as a surprise. If ￿rms do not expect the tax
reform, they will start the adjustment process towards the new equilibrium stock
of capital in the year in which the tax reform takes place. Due to the nature of the
political process we cannot assume that ￿rms were really surprised when the new
tax law became valid in January 2001. So we adopt the approach used in the pre-
vious literature which is to ignore the year in which the tax reform is passed (here:
the year 2000). That means that we consider the years 2001-2003 as the treatment
group and the years 1997-1999 as the control group. Thus, in the second-stage
regression we estimate equations of the following classical di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
form:
Ei;t = ￿0 + ￿1￿TAX + ￿2 (POST ￿ ￿TAX) +
m X
g=3
￿gXg + "i;t if t 6= 2000 (7)
where ￿TAX is the change of the ￿rm-speci￿c tax variable from 2000 to 2001,
POST is a dummy equal to zero for 1997-1999 and equal to one for 2001-2003. The
X are ￿rm-speci￿c control variables. We assume that the X and the tax terms are
not systematically correlated. This assumption will be regularly tested. We have
no prediction for the sign or the signi￿cance of ￿1. But, if it is signi￿cant it seizes
some unobservable ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect. We do expect ￿2 to be signi￿cantly negative.
This approach leads to valid results if there is no unobservable variable (other
than our control variables) which is systematically correlated to the ￿rm-speci￿c
EMTR; the existence of such an unobservable is possible but not likely, though.
Moreover, this approach is in line with the recent critique by Bertrand, Du￿ o and
9Mullainathan (2004) who show that most di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimators are
strongly biased by serial correlation. They propose pooling the pre-reform and
after-reform data in order to overcome these problems.
In principle, we should get the same results by replacing Ei;t by
Ii;t
Ki;t￿1 and
adding a full set of time dummies, i.e. running only one regression. However,
the two alternatives do not yield the same results. The reason might be that the
other control variables, especially those which do not vary much over time, seize
some fraction of the year dummy e⁄ect. In this case the coe¢ cient estimates of
the control variables will be hard to interpret since they confound aggregate and
￿rm-level e⁄ects. Therefore, we stick to the procedure described above, which - in
addition - is more in line with the approach proposed by Cummins et al. (1994).
The approach presented above is based on the assumption that ￿rst, consid-
erable variation in the tax term is required in order to identify the tax impact
on investment, and second, that the adjustment process to the new equilibrium
capital stock lasts more than one period due to adjustment costs. Although we
are convinced that this approach is adequate, we test another approach from the
literature as a robustness check which links periodical changes in the tax variable
to variations in investment of the same period. The regression estimation becomes:
Ei;t = ￿0 + ￿1￿TAXt +
m X
g=2
￿gXg + "i;t (8)
where ￿TAXt is now the periodical tax variation. This approach is appropriate
if one assumes that ￿rms react immediately to even small tax variations which
occur in the data due to minor tax law changes and structural variation in the
balance sheet capital.
Before we present the empirical analysis we should quickly outline why we do
not use the so-called ￿capital-knowledge model￿which is the standard model in
the literature for analyzing foreign direct investment. First, we are interested in
the variation of capital stocks as a response to tax variations, not in their absolute
size. That means, that every time-constant variable determining the capital stock
drops out in our analysis. Second, our data requirements reduce the data sample
considerably and excludes nearly all non-OECD countries. Since OECD countries
are likely to have very similar factor proportions the capital-knowledge model
might not be the best model to work with.
104 The empirical analysis
4.1 The data
4.1.1 FDI data
We use the Micro Database Direct Investment (MiDi) from the Deutsche Bundes-
bank which contains a large sample of German inbound and outbound FDI; for
a detailed description of the database see Lipponer (2003a). We only use the in-
formation on inbound FDI, i.e. the balance sheet data of foreign-held a¢ liates
in Germany. From 1996 on, the data are available as panel data. We construct
a balanced panel data set by excluding all ￿rms which do not have full coverage
from 1996 to 2003. This limits the size of the sample but allows us using the time
series properties of the data. Furthermore, we exclude all state-owned companies
and keep only corporations in the sample. Since our dependent variable
Ii;t
Ki;t￿1 uses
two sequential periods we have seven observations (1997-2003) for each a¢ liate.
These data adjustments leave us with 2830 ￿rms and 19.810 observations. The
variables investment, pro￿tability and debt level are winsorized at the 5 percent
and 95 percent values of their distributions by setting values outside those ranges
to the values at those percentiles.10 Additional information on the FDI data is
given in the appendix.
4.1.2 Tax-related data
As outlined in the previous section, we can di⁄erentiate between two tax e⁄ects.
The ￿rst e⁄ect is that taxes increase the cost of capital and therefore change the
size of the capital stock at which the marginal investment yields a return equal
to the cost of capital. The corresponding indicator is the e⁄ective marginal tax
rate (EMTR), ￿rst developed by King and Fullerton (1984). See Becker and Fuest
(2004) for the derivation of the following ￿rm-speci￿c expression of the EMTR
from the representative ￿rm framework:
EMTRi =
u(1 ￿ Ai ￿ rib)




￿￿￿+(1+￿)￿i. ￿ is the nominal interest rate, and ￿ is the in￿ ation rate.






￿i;j = 1 (10)
10Winsorizing variables is a common method to deal with outliers in this type of data. The
reason is that we observe e.g. debt levels of more than 1000% of total assets and other completely
implausible values.
11where ￿i;j is the fraction of asset j in ￿rm i and the ￿j are estimations of
economic depreciation rates (see the appendix). Ai is the expected value of tax






(1+r)t, where ￿i denotes the fraction
of tangible assets in the capital stock, and the ￿i denote the fraction of the asset
type in the total tangible capital stock of ￿rm i. We can observe ￿i but we cannot
observe the ￿i; instead we assume that these are equal to the average ￿ of the
industry in which the a¢ liate is producing. b is the fraction of debt ￿nance in the
marginal investment; we assume throughout the analysis that b = 0, i.e. we have
pure equity ￿nance.11
The second tax e⁄ect is that taxes reduce the average pro￿tability of discrete
investment projects. Although we do not have data on the location decision of
MNEs with respect to whole a¢ liates, the data suggest that there are discrete
projects which could be realized in one a¢ liate or in another. Therefore, we also
use the e⁄ective average tax rate (EATR), developed by Devereux and Gri¢ th
(2003), as a dependent regression variable. Since we cannot observe the marginal
rate of return pm, we run regressions with several assumed values of pm and assume
that the pro￿tability of the project p can be approximated by the pre-reform












The problem is that we cannot use ￿rms in which p < pm which leads to a
considerable reduction of the data set. For more information on data sources, see
the appendix.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for both the reduced balanced sample and
the whole sample. We report the mean values and standard deviations (in brack-
ets below) of the total balance sheet capital stock (in thousand Euros, including
tangible, intangible and ￿nancial assets), the fraction of non-￿nancial assets, the
fraction of debt ￿nance, pro￿tability measured as periodical pro￿ts over total as-
sets and the ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ective marginal tax rate (EMTR).
As the total assets column shows, the ￿rms in our data sample experienced
high growth rates. Meanwhile, the share of non-￿nancial assets remained on a
surprisingly low but time-constant level. The debt level slightly decreases over
11This assumption is standard in the literature. It is made because the source of ￿nance for the
marginal investment cannot be observed. Taking e.g. the average ￿nancial structure as a proxy
may be highly misleading. For instancew, a high average debt level may imply that additional
investment has to be ￿nanced by equity. But it may also re￿ ect good access to or a good rating
in the capital market.
12time. The pro￿tability measure is relatively stable in spite of the strong business
cycle impact. The tax reform in 2000 reduces the EMTR from over 50% to under
40% in the post-reform period.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Year EMTR
balanced whole balanced whole balanced whole balanced whole balanced
1996 48 553 70 483 .20 .19 0.66 .71  .07  .09 0.5758
(352 207) (435 427) (.23) (.24) (0.31) (.38) (.32) (.39) (0.0106)
1997 54 000 78 500 .20 .18 0.66 .70 .08 .10 0.5759
(443 309) (496 969) (.23) (.24) (0.31) (.38) (.31) (.39) (0.0106)
1998 64 372 84 437 .20 .18 0.65 .69 .10  .11 0.5657
(575 958) (562 012) (.23) (.24) (0.31) (.38) (.31) (.39) (0.0106)
1999 69 532 106 103 .20 .19 0.65 .69  .09  .11 0.5257
(721 851) (858 888) (.23) (.24) (0.31) (.38) (.31) (.39) (0.0110)
2000 76 844 130 058 .20 .18 0.64 .68  .09  .10 0.5255
(855 132) (1 636 306) (.23) (.24) (0.31) (.38) (.31) (.38) (0.0112)
2001 80 599 131 891 .20 .19 0.63 .67  .09  .10 0.3876
(864 479) (1 293 160) (.23) (.24) (0.32) (.39) (.31) (.39) (0.0101)
2002 76 030 193 704 .20 .20 0.61 .62  .08  .06 0.3877
(703 414) (1 722 195) (.23) (.25) (0.33) (.37) (.31) (.36) (0.0102)
2003 89 152 202 237 .19  .20 0.59 .60  .08  .07 0.4077
(1 024 766) (1 789 026) (.23) (.25) (0.33) (.37) (.30) (.33) (0.0103)
Notes: The table reports the means for the sample under consideration and the standard deviation in brackets below.
Non-financial assets Debt level Profitability Total assets in 1000 Euro
Comparing the summary statistics of our data sample with the raw data (before
reductions and balancing), it turns out that the average ￿rm in the reduced sample
is smaller than in the complete sample. We cannot compare the growth rates in
a sensible way because the number of ￿rms in the raw data varies considerably.
Notably, there is a considerable reduction in the number of ￿rms in 2002, which is
due to legal changes.12 The fraction of non-￿nancial assets and the level of debt
￿nance do not di⁄er too much between the two samples. The ￿rms in the balanced
sample seem to be less pro￿table on average than in the raw data, but that changes
in 2002. After all, we do not expect to have strong selection bias in our analysis.
4.3 Investment before and after the reform
In order to get a ￿rst impression of the di⁄erences between these subsamples,
table 3 reports the investment ratio (before demeaning) at the 25th percentile,
the median and the 75th percentile. For each subgroup, the pre-reform (1997-
1999) and post-reform average values (2001-2003) are reported. The median ￿rm
in the total sample invested 7,5% of its capital stock before the reform and 3,7%
afterwards. Investment by the median European investor fell from an average 6,9%
12The number of observations (including redundancies due to several investors) increases from
around 15 000 in 1996 to 17 000 in 2001, but then drops to around 12 000 in 2002.
13to 3,9%. American and Asian median companies invested signi￿cantly more before
the reform but experienced a more accentuated fall in investment after the reform.
As to branches of activity, the manufacturing branch had the lowest investment
level at the median before the reform. After the reform, the median companies in
all branches had investment levels around 3%-4%. Finally, as one would expect
pro￿table ￿rms, i.e. those with a positive average pre-reform pro￿tability, invest
more, before and after the reform. The di⁄erence, though, is not as accentuated
as one might think.
There are two important features of the data which can be nicely illustrated
with the help of table 3. First, there is enormous variance in the investment levels.
At the 75th percentile, the companies in the sample had a pre-reform investment
level of 25% whereas, at the 25th percentile, the companies disinvested (even before
2001). Second, nearly all investment levels fall after the reform which hints at the
strong aggregate e⁄ect from the business cycle. Interestingly, holdings at the 75th
percentile are the only subgroup to increase their investment after the reform.
Table 3: Investment before and after the tax reform.
pre-reform post-reform pre-reform post-reform pre-reform post-reform pre-reform post-reform
p25 -0,0171 -0,0465 -0,0202 -0,0453 -0,0093 -0,0333 -0,0078 -0,0759
median 0,0752 0,0369 0,0683 0,0386 0,0946 0,0431 0,0782 0,0036
p75 0,2500 0,2000 0,2467 0,2164 0,2912 0,1958 0,2072 0,0947
pre-reform post-reform pre-reform post-reform pre-reform post-reform pre-reform post-reform
p25 -0,0293 -0,0439 -0,0037 -0,0270 -0,0058 -0,0574 -0,0372 -0,1042
median 0,0441 0,0297 0,0726 0,0354 0,0926 0,0291 0,0584 0,0403
p75 0,1553 0,1481 0,2681 0,4271 0,2390 0,1449 0,3868 0,2188
pre-reform post-reform pre-reform post-reform pre-reform post-reform
p25 0,0150 -0,0760 -0,0103 -0,0362 -0,0448 -0,0737
median 0,0857 0,0366 0,0812 0,0416 0,0507 0,0137
p75 0,4653 0,2477 0,2572 0,2024 0,2302 0,1880
Profitable Non-profitable
Notes: The pre-reform values are the average of the 1997-1999 period, the post-reform values the average of the 2001-2003 period.




Holdings Wholesale Services to Companies
Financial Services
4.4 First approach: di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimation
4.4.1 Baseline estimation
Table 4 shows the results of the baseline estimation regressions. The dependent
variable is the Eit as described in equation (6). Note that our estimation results are
biased downwards due to the neglection of the aggregate e⁄ect of the tax reform.
14The estimation values can therefore be regarded as a conservative bottom line.
Explanations of the variable de￿nitions in table 3 can be found in the notes below
the table.
The ￿rst column in table 3 reports our baseline estimation with a treatment
group of 2001-2003 and a control group of 1997-1999. We control for period-
ical pro￿tability, measured as a fraction of ￿rm equity, non-￿nancial assets and
debt ￿nance, both measured as a fraction of total assets; sales over total assets,
which can be interpreted as an indicator for the capital-intensity of production, the
growth of sales, the size of the ￿rm (i.e. the total capital stock in absolute value),
the number of employees divided through total assets and, ￿nally, the number of
investors. A full set of country dummies and branch dummies is employed.
Before we analyze the results of the tax term we quickly discuss the outcomes
of the control variables which are quite interesting, too. The term pro￿tability
is positive but not signi￿cant, taken apart some exceptions which are discussed
later on. Firms with a high fraction of non-￿nancial assets invest signi￿cantly less
than others. High-debt ￿rms invest more, and ￿rms with a high sales over assets
ratio invest less. The growth rate of sales has a strong impact on investment,
as one would expect. Note, though, that this coe¢ cient should be interpreted as
an idiosyncratic demand impact to an individual ￿rm, since we cleaned the data
from any aggregate demand in￿ uence. The number of workers has a strongly
negative and highly signi￿cant impact. Finally, the number of investors has a
clear negative impact on investment: Ceteris paribus, an increase in the number
of investors lowers investment.
Now, consider the tax variables. As outlined in the previous section the coe¢ -
cient of the term ￿EMTR is hard to interpret in a sensible way; it is not signi￿cant,
either, and shows large variation over the course of regressions. In column (1), the
treatment e⁄ect of the tax reform with respect to the variation in the e⁄ective
marginal tax rate (￿EMTR*POST) is equal to -0,1034. It has the expected sign
and is highly signi￿cant. If this ￿rst regression is valid, a reduction of the EMTR
of 10 percentage points leads to an increase in foreign direct investment ￿ ow of
1,034 percentage points. If median investment is at 7,5% (see table 3) and the
EMTR around 0,52 (see table 2), the resulting elasticity is " = ￿0;72.
The EMTR is calculated by using the fraction of non-￿nancial assets and total
assets. One might argue that those variables and the EMTR interact and distort
the estimation or that the observed tax e⁄ect is an artefact due to multicollinearity.
Therefore, we repeat the baseline regression in column (2) holding constant all
parameters of the EMTR term except the tax parameters. The tax e⁄ect remains
virtually the same. Column (3) adds the year 2000 to the control group; the
treatment e⁄ect becomes slightly stronger. Nevertheless, for all of the following
regressions we stick to our approach of excluding the 2000 data because of the
15methodological reasons explained above. In column (4), we repeated the baseline
regression by taking pre-reform averages of all control variables that are normalized
by total assets. We do so in order to check whether we might run the risk of having
some endogeneity bias that results from the fact that total assets is part of the
dependent variable as well as of several independent variables. The tax e⁄ect
is slightly increased which makes us con￿dent that we can use our speci￿cation
without exaggerating the treatment e⁄ect of the tax reform.
Tabelle 4: Baseline regressions










ΔEMTR 0.8824 0.4337 1.1174 1.7658 0.8527 0.1357 2.9585
(0.9572) (0.3758) (0.8744) (0.9451) (0.9576) (1.1016) (1.9073)
ΔEMTR*POST -0.1034 -0.1018 -0.1196 -0.1472 -0.1027 -0.1306 0.0193
(0.0437)* (0.0437)* (0.0410)** (0.0445)** (0.0437)* (0.0496)** (0.0942)
PROFITABILITY 0.0136 0.0138 0.0153 0.0401 0.0529 -0.0107 0.0383
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0176)* (0.0109)** (0.0140) (0.0192)*
NON-FIN ASSETS -0.2137 -0.2078 -0.2242 -0.0760 -0.2119 -0.1945 -0.2511
(0.0215)** (0.0176)** (0.0198)** (0.0219)** (0.0215)** (0.0251)** (0.0424)**
DEBT 0.0501 0.0500 0.0547 0.0405 0.0496 0.0493 0.0728
(0.0109)** (0.0109)** (0.0101)** (0.0123)** (0.0108)** (0.0125)** (0.0237)**
SALES -0.0649 -0.0650 -0.0651 0.0124 -0.0654 -0.0640 -0.0721
(0.0029)** (0.0029)** (0.0027)** (0.0034)** (0.0029)** (0.0033)** (0.0063)**
SALESGROWTH 0.4508 0.4509 0.4541 0.4167 0.4504 0.4649 0.4097
(0.0136)** (0.0136)** (0.0124)** (0.0138)** (0.0136)** (0.0156)** (0.0275)**
SIZE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)* (0.0000) (0.0000)** (0.0000) (0.0000)**
EMPLOYEES -2.4775 -2.5297 -2.6468 1.4050 -2.4256 -2.4777 -1.8312
(0.6278)** (0.6211)** (0.5801)** (0.6913)* (0.6284)** (0.7245)** (1.2576)
INVESTORS -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0067 -0.0107 -0.0071 -0.0074 -0.0114
(0.0029)* (0.0029)* (0.0027)* (0.0030)** (0.0029)* (0.0031)* (0.0105)
CONSTANT 0.1924 0.1332 0.2193 0.2060 0.1908 0.0919 0.4716
(0.1467) (0.0851) (0.1311) (0.1452) (0.1467) (0.1861) (0.2740)
No of Obs 14684 14684 17155 14692 14679 11334 3350
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.22
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is net investment over total assets in
the preceding period. PROFITABILITY is measured by periodical profits over total assets; NONFINANASSETS is the fraction of nonfinancial
assets in the total capital stock, DEBT measures the fraction of debt finance in the total capital stock. SALES are defined as sales over total
assets. SALESGROWTH is equal to the growth rate of sales: (sales of t minus sales of t-1)/(sales of t-1). SIZE is the absolute balance sheet
value of total assets. WORKERS is the number of employees divided through total assets. INVESTORS is the number of foreign investors as it is
reported in the data set. To be included, affiliates data have to cover the whole period from 1996 to 2003. The largest and the lowest 5% of the
variables NONFINANASSETS, DEBT and SALES have been winsorized. All regressions are corrected for hetereskedasticity. The robust
standard errors are reported in brackets below the coefficient values. We checked for cluster specific heteroskedasticity (countries and branches)




BRANCH DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
In columns (5) and (6) we run two more robustness checks by employing prof-
itability as lagged regressors. The lagged pro￿tability has a higher coe¢ cient than
in the baseline estimation and it is signi￿cant. This could be interpreted as a
hint to liquidity constraints. We will discuss the role of pro￿tability later on. In
columns (7) and (8), we split the sample in those ￿rms that were pro￿table on
16average in the years 1997-2000 and those which were not. That is, we introduce
a second dimension of control and treatment groups. One would expect that non-
pro￿table ￿rms are not tax-sensitive since they do not pay any taxes or they have
loss carry forwards as e⁄ective tax shields for the future. Actually, the pro￿table
￿rms have a signi￿cant negative tax impact on investment and the non-pro￿table
do not. Pro￿table ￿rms increase their investment by 0,13 for every unit reduction
in the EMTR.
After the ￿rst set of regressions, we feel con￿dent to state
Result 1 A reduction of the e⁄ective marginal tax rate of 10 percentage points
leads to an increase of inward FDI of 1 percentage point. This corresponds
to an investment elasticity of " = ￿0;7. Nonpro￿table ￿rms are not tax
sensitive whereas pro￿table ￿rms show an investment elasticity of around
"prof = ￿0;85 (evaluated at the median value, as reported in table 3).
This result refers to the whole sample under consideration. As Buch et al.
(2005) emphasize, FDI data is characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity.
In the following subsections, we will try to reduce this heterogeneity by building
adequate subsamples.
4.4.2 Regions and branches
In this subsection we split the sample into di⁄erent subgroups according to regional
aspects and branches of activity.
In table 5 we report the regression results for the di⁄erent regional and branch
subgroups. In the ￿rst four columns of table 5, we repeat the baseline estima-
tion for investors from di⁄erent regions. Surprisingly, a¢ liates with American and
Asian investors do not show any signi￿cant reaction to the tax reform. In contrast,
for European-held a¢ liates, in column (3), the regression yields a strong and signi-
￿cant tax impact of ￿0;178, which corresponds to an elasticity of "euro = ￿1;38.
Column (4) reports the results for those countries which have a common border
with Germany. Compared with the results in (3), the tax impact is considerably
increased, up to ￿0;2576. The corresponding elasticity is "direct = ￿1;30 (median
investment is at 0;10, not reported in the tables). The results reported in columns
(1) to (4) are perfectly in line with the common story saying that we should expect
a higher degree of tax competition within Europe. Meanwhile, intercontinental in-
vestment is supposed to be more motivated by market entry reasons than by cost
considerations.
Therefore, we state
Result 2 American and Asian investments are not tax-sensitive with respect to
the e⁄ective marginal tax rate. European held a¢ liates show strong and
17signi￿cant tax sensitivity. Investors from countries with a common border
with Germany react even more strongly to variations in the EMTR.
One intuitive and often used way of building subgroups is the separation of
countries with an exemption system from those with a credit system. We did
not do so because Germany is the country with the highest corporate tax rate.
Therefore both systems lead to the same result: The e⁄ective tax rate on corporate
income in German a¢ liates is the German one.
In columns (5) to (9) we report the results of di⁄erent branch subgroups.13
The two largest groups are manufacturing ￿rms and wholesale traders. Intuitively,
one would expect manufacturing a¢ liates to be cost-sensitive and therefore tax-
reagible, whereas wholesale traders follow consumers and are more market-entry
driven.
Table 5: Regional aspects and different branches











ΔEMTR 5.0956 0.8446 0.0461 0.7359 1.2538 16.1055 1.6306 4.9202 -13.3024
(2.4906)* (3.9157) (1.0582) (1.0919) (1.4855) (6.5759)* (2.0298) (4.2406) (15.5386)
ΔEMTR*POST 0.1442 0.0016 -0.1780 -0.2576 -0.1905 -1.0508 -0.0262 0.5423 0.5310
(0.1067) (0.1044) (0.0528)** (0.0571)** (0.0676)** (0.3963)** (0.0590) (0.2613)* (0.5503)
PROFITABILITY -0.0104 0.0344 0.0174 0.0114 0.0375 -0.0887 0.0199 -0.0057 -0.0605
(0.0261) (0.0291) (0.0128) (0.0141) (0.0184)* (0.1018) (0.0146) (0.0596) (0.1248)
NON-FIN ASSETS -0.2901 -0.1501 -0.2047 -0.2386 -0.2095 0.1376 -0.1795 -0.3309 0.1704
(0.0554)** (0.0706)* (0.0243)** (0.0254)** (0.0325)** (0.2244) (0.0354)** (0.0990)** (0.3020)
DEBT 0.0119 0.0578 0.0595 0.0838 0.0475 0.1706 0.0628 -0.0399 0.3051
(0.0245) (0.0312) (0.0129)** (0.0140)** (0.0176)** (0.0852)* (0.0152)** (0.0543) (0.1602)
SALES -0.0729 -0.0635 -0.0631 -0.0640 -0.0785 -0.1702 -0.0631 -0.0844 -0.1198
(0.0074)** (0.0085)** (0.0034)** (0.0036)** (0.0064)** (0.0405)** (0.0037)** (0.0159)** (0.0498)*
SALESGROWTH 0.4401 0.5102 0.4454 0.4531 0.5592 -0.0993 0.5429 0.3287 0.2433
(0.0316)** (0.0349)** (0.0164)** (0.0171)** (0.0258)** (0.0568) (0.0197)** (0.0520)** (0.1092)*
SIZE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)** (0.0000) (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)
EMPLOYEES -3.2067 -3.0146 -2.3190 -2.3202 -2.8056 20.2582 -4.6117 2.5815 3.8402
(1.4293)* (2.6640) (0.7229)** (0.7700)** (0.9979)** (22.3684) (1.0341)** (2.9852) (11.8213)
INVESTORS -0.0087 -0.0066 -0.0070 -0.0062 -0.0051 -0.0119 -0.0074 -0.0135 0.0142
(0.0042)* (0.0118) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0527) (0.0068) (0.0233) (0.1093)
Constant 0.9236 0.1283 0.0984 0.1898 0.1328 3.4519 0.3596 0.9484 -2.1266
(0.3428)** (0.5446) (0.1468) (0.1512) (0.2129) (0.9863)** (0.2971) (0.6130) (2.2179)
Observations 2466 1583 10635 9123 4679 530 6214 701 176
R-squared 0.20 0.29 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.27 0.16 0.24
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is net investment over total assets in the preceding
period. For further information, see table 4.
Yes Yes
No No No No
Yes
No




13Unfortunately we cannot observe branch switchers, i.e. a¢ liates which have a branch of
activity di⁄erent from the one of their mother company, as do Buch et al. (2005) because the
inbound data do not include data on the mother ￿rms.
18Actually, our data con￿rm this expectation, which we formulate as
Result 3 Among the two dominant groups in our data sample, only the manu-
facturing ￿rms show a signi￿cant tax e⁄ect. Wholesale traders do not seem
to be tax sensitive.
The treatment e⁄ect for holdings is nearly ten times higher than the one of
the total sample. But, the standard error is larger, too, and the subsample of
holdings is relatively small. Next, we will analyze the sample in di⁄erent quartile
subgroups.
4.4.3 Quartile analysis
In the following, we split the sample in quartile subgroups according to the average
pre-reform pro￿tability. Table 6a shows the results.
Table 6a: Quartile analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quartiles first second third fourth first second third fourth
ΔEMTR 2.7468 -0.8406 -1.0626 -1.1389 2.5848 -0.7782 -0.9765 -1.0233
(1.2259)* (1.5599) (1.6452) (1.5225) (1.2253)* (1.5578) (1.6424) (1.5247)
ΔEMTR*POST -0.1410 -0.1967 -0.0038 0.0354 -0.1481 -0.1916 -0.0107 -0.0192
(0.0843) (0.0981)* (0.0802) (0.0900) (0.0833) (0.0980) (0.0800) (0.0889)
PROFITABILITY 0.0402 0.0224 -0.0015 -0.0442 0.0555 0.0614 0.0812 0.0190
(0.0190)* (0.0322) (0.0224) (0.0181)* (0.0189)** (0.0329) (0.0228)** (0.0174)
NON-FIN ASSETS -0.2560 -0.1235 -0.2000 -0.1887 -0.2551 -0.1253 -0.1985 -0.1932
(0.0313)** (0.0419)** (0.0365)** (0.0379)** (0.0312)** (0.0418)** (0.0364)** (0.0380)**
DEBT 0.0894 0.1414 0.0494 -0.0347 0.0948 0.1419 0.0514 -0.0443
(0.0203)** (0.0243)** (0.0195)* (0.0190) (0.0203)** (0.0243)** (0.0195)** (0.0188)*
SALES -0.0741 -0.0577 -0.0626 -0.0717 -0.0740 -0.0578 -0.0633 -0.0729
(0.0056)** (0.0064)** (0.0053)** (0.0057)** (0.0056)** (0.0064)** (0.0053)** (0.0057)**
SALESGROWTH 0.4234 0.4218 0.4433 0.5088 0.4219 0.4219 0.4440 0.5094
(0.0150)** (0.0190)** (0.0164)** (0.0169)** (0.0150)** (0.0190)** (0.0163)** (0.0170)**
SIZE 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000)** (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)**
EMPLOYEES -3.1506 -0.6664 -2.7186 -2.7107 -3.0535 -0.6245 -2.6280 -2.6893
(1.1742)** (1.4987) (1.2922)* (1.2919)* (1.1734)** (1.4980) (1.2904)* (1.2934)*
INVESTORS -0.0143 0.0046 -0.0129 -0.0045 -0.0144 0.0044 -0.0129 -0.0053
(0.0094) (0.0102) (0.0095) (0.0067) (0.0094) (0.0077) (0.0095) (0.0067)
Constant 0.4494 -0.2596 0.2961 -0.1241 0.2331 0.1935 -0.0140 0.3669
(0.1966)* (0.2958) (0.2986) (0.2783) (0.2485) (0.2423) (0.2479) (0.2857)
Observations 4464 2688 3757 3775 4462 2688 3755 3774





Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is net investment over total assets
in the preceding period. For further information, see table 4.
Average pre-reform profitability Average pre-reform profitability (with lagged profitability)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Our ￿ndings are surprising, which is stated by
19Result 4 Nonpro￿table ￿rms and those with an above-average pro￿tability do
not show any signi￿cant tax impact. In contrast, ￿rms with a positive but
below-median pro￿tability14 have a strong and signi￿cant tax impact.
This could be due to the fact that highly pro￿table ￿rms do react more strongly
to tax rate cuts than to variations in the size of the tax base. Since tax rate cuts are
equal for all ￿rms their impact is part of the aggregate e⁄ect which we eliminated
in the ￿rst-stage regression. A second possible explanation is liquidity constraints
which might play a role for ￿rms with a below median pro￿tability. If ￿rms are
liquidity or credit constrained, they will react to tax cuts as if they were not (and
just adapting to new levels of capital costs). Therefore we face an additional iden-
ti￿cation problem, which proves to be hard to solve. In order to check whether
these results are due to simultaneity e⁄ects, we instrument pro￿tability with its
lagged t ￿ 1 value in columns (5) to (8). In the ￿rst three quartiles lagged prof-
itability is (at least marginally) signi￿cant and positive. It is striking that in the
second quartile both the tax impact and lagged pro￿tability are only marginally
signi￿cant, which might hint at multicollinearity.
The estimations reported in table 6b allow pursuing this question further. Here
we split the sample according to debt fraction quartiles and non-￿nancial asset
fraction quartiles. Columns (1) to (4) show the regression results for quartiles of
debt ￿nance which can be summarized in
Result 5 As predicted by standard tax theory, ￿rms with a low debt level react
strongly to the variation in the e⁄ective marginal tax rate, whereas ￿rms
with high debt levels - i.e. with already high tax shields - do not react
signi￿cantly.
Interestingly, in the two ￿rst debt quartiles the pro￿tability regressor is signi-
￿cantly positive. If low levels of debt are a hint at credit constraints, this again
could nourrish the idea that liquidity constraints play an important role to ex-
plain the investment process. In columns (5) to (8) the results for the quartiles
of non-￿nancial assets are reported. In the tax reform debate in Germany some
economists expected ￿rms with a high fraction of non-￿nancial assets to lose for
the following reason. As indicated in section 2, the tax reform implied tax rate
cuts and base broadening elements. The latter apply mainly to non-￿nancial as-
sets, which means that ￿rms with more ￿nancial assets bene￿t more from the tax
14If one compares the number of observations in the ￿rst quartile with those in the subgroup
of non-pro￿table ￿rms in table 4, it is clear that there are only ￿rms in the second quartile
with a positive pre-reform pro￿tability. The reason why the number of observations in the ￿rst
and the second quartile di⁄er so much is that there is a bunching of observations at an average
pro￿tability of zero.
20reform than those with less ￿nancial assets. Via general equilibrium e⁄ects (e.g.
rising interest rates and wages), ￿rms with a high fraction of non-￿nancial assets
would lose.
Table 6b: Quartile analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quartiles first second third fourth first second third fourth
ΔEMTR 1.6652 1.2231 -0.3036 0.0276 4.5709 5.0544 0.2933 -1.5572
(1.3829) (1.3694) (1.4605) (1.5617) (2.6947) (1.9005)** (1.3603) (0.9535)
ΔEMTR*POST -0.3066 -0.0732 -0.0642 -0.1051 -0.2174 0.0661 -0.1593 -0.2338
(0.0858)** (0.0768) (0.0833) (0.1037) (0.1340) (0.0804) (0.0709)* (0.0790)**
PROFITABILITY 0.1489 0.1330 0.0370 0.0078 0.0001 0.0245 0.0218 0.0062
(0.0346)** (0.0255)** (0.0217) (0.0152) (0.0289) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0168)
NON-FIN ASSETS -0.1750 -0.1991 -0.2364 -0.1941 -4.2920 -0.2415 -0.1996 -0.1160
(0.0353)** (0.0330)** (0.0363)** (0.0401)** (2.3505) (0.2427) (0.0750)** (0.0437)**
DEBT 0.1142 0.1561 0.1402 -0.3147 0.1208 0.0213 0.0431 0.0128
(0.0569)* (0.0703)* (0.1012) (0.0534)** (0.0289)** (0.0189) (0.0176)* (0.0175)
SALES -0.0648 -0.0714 -0.0674 -0.0746 -0.0501 -0.0725 -0.0652 -0.0644
(0.0065)** (0.0053)** (0.0055)** (0.0062)** (0.0075)** (0.0047)** (0.0050)** (0.0069)**
SALESGROWTH 0.4038 0.4629 0.4671 0.4389 0.2842 0.5083 0.5711 0.4583
(0.0164)** (0.0161)** (0.0167)** (0.0176)** (0.0216)** (0.0157)** (0.0151)** (0.0156)**
SIZE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)** (0.0000) (0.0000)* (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
EMPLOYEES 1.1523 -0.5623 -2.9574 -4.3845 -5.3129 -2.4912 -2.1794 -1.0620
(1.3611) (1.1684) (1.2643)* (1.4310)** (2.9364) (1.3026) (1.0576)* (1.1560)
INVESTORS -0.0089 -0.0034 -0.0124 -0.0057 -0.0027 -0.0163 -0.0024 -0.0070
(0.0066) (0.0077) (0.0089) (0.0127) (0.0198) (0.0111) (0.0057) (0.0064)
Constant 0.2331 0.1935 -0.0140 0.3669 0.9020 0.7473 0.0302 -0.2560
(0.2485) (0.2423) (0.2479) (0.2857) (0.4218)* (0.2926)* (0.2445) (0.1887)
Observations 3556 3928 3789 3411 2635 4047 4074 3928
R-squared 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.11 0.26 0.29 0.21
Yes
Yes
Debt fraction Non-financial asset fraction
Yes Yes Yes COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is net investment over total assets
in the preceding period. For further information, see table 4.
Yes
BRANCH DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Our results show the opposite, though:
Result 6 Firms with a high fraction of non-￿nancial assets react strongly and
signi￿cantly to the tax cuts, whereas ￿rms with a low fraction do not.
It should be noted here that the multi-equation Wald test does not reject the
null hypothesis that the tax terms in all four quartiles (debt and non-￿nancial
assets) are jointly not di⁄erent from zero. We also analyzed quartile subgroups
according to size and employees, but we did not ￿nd any systematic pattern.
4.5 Second approach: periodical variations
In the following subsection, we rerun some of the regressions from above using
the second approach outlined in the theoretical section. In contrast to the ￿rst
21approach, it uses the periodical variation of the EMTR and not only the di⁄erence
between the pre-reform and the post-reform era. The underlying idea is that in-
vestment adapts immediately to even small variations in the tax incentive scheme.
Although we think that this approach has less power both in econometric and
plausiblity terms, we use this approach as a robustness check.
Table 7 shows the results using the period to period variation in the EMTR.
In column (1) the baseline speci￿cation is reported. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient
estimate is virtually the same as in the ￿rst approach. All other variables yield
similar results, too, and even the data ￿t (R2 = 0;2) is equal. In column (2) and
(3) the sample is split between pro￿table and nonpro￿table ￿rms. Again, it turns
out that pro￿table ￿rms show a highly signi￿cant negative tax impact, whereas
nonpro￿table ￿rms have a coe¢ cient estimate with the wrong sign. Columns (4)
and (5) report the results for the European investors and those who are located
in countries which share a common border with Germany. Again, we see that
the European subsample shows a higher tax impact compared to the baseline
estimation; the direct neighbours have an even higher coe¢ cient. In columns (6)
and (7), we report the results for the manufacturing and the wholesale branch. In
contrast to the ￿rst approach, none of the two has a signi￿cant tax term.
Tabelle 7: Periodical variation of the EMTR













ΔEMTR(t) -0.1173 -0.2254 0.2488 -0.1544 -0.1693 -0.0732 -0.1053
(0.0559)* (0.0644)** (0.1111)* (0.0672)* (0.0761)* (0.0889) (0.0760)
PROFITABILITY 0.0152 -0.0070 0.0414 0.0160 0.0124 0.0443 0.0272
(0.0101) (0.0132) (0.0178)* (0.0118) (0.0138) (0.0174)* (0.0137)*
NON-FIN ASSETS -0.2107 -0.2069 -0.2127 -0.2120 -0.2262 -0.2016 -0.1785
(0.0154)** (0.0180)** (0.0307)** (0.0171)** (0.0192)** (0.0237)** (0.0308)**
DEBT 0.0524 0.0510 0.0810 0.0598 0.0772 0.0497 0.0563
(0.0101)** (0.0115)** (0.0222)** (0.0119)** (0.0136)** (0.0165)** (0.0144)**
SALES -0.0651 -0.0645 -0.0713 -0.0622 -0.0625 -0.0755 -0.0648
(0.0027)** (0.0030)** (0.0060)** (0.0031)** (0.0035)** (0.0060)** (0.0034)**
SALESGROWTH 0.4524 0.4623 0.4248 0.4428 0.4448 0.5613 0.5514
(0.0124)** (0.0142)** (0.0252)** (0.0149)** (0.0168)** (0.0232)** (0.0178)**
SIZE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000)** (0.0000) (0.0000)** (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
EMPLOYEES -2.8512 -2.4435 -3.4152 -2.6920 -2.6154 -3.4766 -5.1654
(0.5712)** (0.6556)** (1.1841)** (0.6532)** (0.7404)** (0.9101)** (0.9606)**
INVESTORS -0.0068 -0.0065 -0.0191 -0.0086 -0.0084 -0.0064 -0.0029
(0.0028)* (0.0029)* (0.0102) (0.0037)* (0.0040)* (0.0031)* (0.0065)
CONSTANT 0.0693 0.0676 0.0784 0.1046 0.1053 -0.0562 0.1257
(0.0545) (0.0837) (0.0744) (0.0160)** (0.0182)** (0.0440) (0.0768)
No of Obs 17155 13235 3920 12431 9561 5453 7269
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.28
Yes
No No
Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is net investment over




Yes Yes Yes Yes
22We can therefore state
Result 7 The model with periodical variation yields virtually the same results
as the ￿rst approach. The results with respect to pro￿tability and regional
aspects are replicated, while the branch di⁄erences cannot be established.
4.6 Marginal versus discrete investment
As we outline in the previous section our data only allows analyzing investment de-
cisions after the location decision has been made. But, although location decisions
themselves are not observable, one could argue that MNE make quasi-location
decisions for the production of new goods. In other words, our data may allow
to analyze project mobility and not ￿rm mobility. As mentioned above, marginal
investment decisions do not depend on other locations￿characteristics whereas
discrete investment decisions do.
As an alternative tax rate measure which is supposed to seize the incentive ef-
fects for discrete investment choices we calculate the e⁄ective average tax rate
(EATR) according to equation (11). The regression variable is the di⁄erence
between the EATR of the year 2000 and the year 2001. For the calculation of
the EATR we need an assumption on the return to the marginal investment unit
and the actual pro￿tability of the project under consideration. We assume that
the marginal return (or: cost of capital) is equal to 5% and that the project pro￿t-
ability can be approximated by the average pre-reform pro￿tability of the a¢ liate.
Consequently, we have to exclude all ￿rms with a pre-reform pro￿tability lower
than 5% which reduces our data sample considerably. Therefore, we repeat the
analysis for the EMTR in order to have a valid reference case.
First, we repeat the ￿rst approach with the EATR di⁄erential to the parent
company country of residence. Unfortunately, as long as the tax systems of other
locations stay constant from 2000 to 2001, the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimation
approach that we use here neglects the other locations￿parameters. But, in a
second step section we try the second approach with periodical variations in the
tax system which allows us to use this information.
In columns (1) and (2) of table 8 the baseline regression is estimated for the
EATR and EMTR. Both tax treatment e⁄ects are not signi￿cant, which we ex-
pected given the results of the quartile analysis of pro￿tability in table 6. What
is striking, though, is the fact that both coe¢ cient estimates are very close, even
in terms of standard errors. The estimations are repeated for the subgroup of
European a¢ liates (where the tax term is signi￿cant) and for a¢ liates in the man-
ufacturing branch. In all three cases, the EATR has a slightly lower standard
error, i.e. a better ￿t. But the di⁄erence is too low to be interpreted in qualitative
terms.
23One might think that the EATR is rather important for investment from Amer-
ican or Asian companies. But, as we do not report here, the results are not signi-
￿cant, have the wrong sign and show a large variance. We further tried regressions
with the EATR calculated with assumed pro￿t rates of ten and twenty percent,
rather than the pre-reform average pro￿t rate, but the results do not di⁄er much.
Tabelle 8: EATR versus EMTR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔEATR -3.4943 -3.4296 -2.3128
(2.8500) (3.1676) (3.9007)
ΔEATR*POST -0.0159 -0.1613 -0.0345
(0.0581) (0.0707)* (0.0922)
ΔEMTR -0.3527 -0.8563 -0.8535
(1.5461) (1.8399) (2.2771)
ΔEMTR*POST -0.0162 -0.1648 -0.0353
(0.0589) (0.0718)* (0.0954)
PROFITABILITY -0.0205 -0.0188 -0.0146 -0.0126 -0.0027 -0.0005
(0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0184) (0.0182) (0.0277) (0.0272)
NON-FIN ASSETS -0.1870 -0.1989 -0.1692 -0.1742 -0.1835 -0.1862
(0.0296)** (0.0325)** (0.0339)** (0.0386)** (0.0479)** (0.0506)**
DEBT 0.0084 0.0095 0.0147 0.0159 0.0361 0.0371
(0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0252) (0.0251)
SALES -0.0657 -0.0657 -0.0598 -0.0598 -0.0755 -0.0757
(0.0039)** (0.0039)** (0.0046)** (0.0046)** (0.0093)** (0.0093)**
SALESGROWTH 0.4792 0.4792 0.4713 0.4715 0.6029 0.6029
(0.0184)** (0.0184)** (0.0229)** (0.0229)** (0.0384)** (0.0383)**
SIZE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
EMPLOYEES -2.7269 -2.6460 -2.8472 -2.7974 -4.3568 -4.3069
(0.9049)** (0.9069)** (1.0525)** (1.0563)** (1.5697)** (1.5632)**
INVESTORS -0.0056 -0.0053 -0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0035
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0033) (0.0034)
CONSTANT -0.3066 0.1300 -0.3383 0.0201 -0.1118 0.0903
(0.4193) (0.2541) (0.4611) (0.2889) (0.5785) (0.3764)
No of Obs 7723 7723 5357 5357 2203 2203
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.32 0.32
Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is net
investment over total assets in the preceding period. For further information, see table 4. The EATR is calculated for an
assumed capital cost of 5%. The expected profitability of the project is approximated by the average pre-reform
profitability of the affiliate.




COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Now, we repeat the analysis with periodical variation of the two tax terms. The
main advantage of this approach is that it allows taking into account variations
in the e⁄ective tax parameters of other locations. In table 9 we report the results
of estimations that compare the performance of the EMTR, i.e. the marginal
investment model, and the EATR, i.e. the discrete investment model. For lack of
better information, we assume that the alternative location is the parent company
￿ s country of residence.
24Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation results for the baseline regression
using the periodical variation of the di⁄erence in the EATR between the two
locations and the EMTR, respectively. Columns (3) to (8) report the results for
di⁄erent subgroups that proved to be relevant in the preceding analysis: European
investors, the manufacturing branch, and a¢ liates with just one investor.
Table 9: Mobile projects versus mobile capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔDIFFEATR(t) -0.1973 -0.2973 -0.1450
(0.0756)** (0.0927)** (0.1213)
ΔEMTR(t) -0.2354 -0.3406 -0.1440
(0.0775)** (0.0946)** (0.1235)
PROFITABILITY -0.0126 -0.0126 -0.0102 -0.0102 0.0041 0.0039
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0263) (0.0263)
NON-FIN ASSETS -0.2194 -0.2166 -0.2044 -0.2009 -0.2106 -0.2095
(0.0228)** (0.0228)** (0.0256)** (0.0256)** (0.0353)** (0.0352)**
DEBT 0.0188 0.0189 0.0205 0.0211 0.0352 0.0348
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0234) (0.0234)
SALES -0.0665 -0.0664 -0.0601 -0.0601 -0.0745 -0.0743
(0.0037)** (0.0037)** (0.0043)** (0.0043)** (0.0088)** (0.0087)**
SALESGROWTH 0.4805 0.4803 0.4618 0.4617 0.6179 0.6180
(0.0172)** (0.0172)** (0.0215)** (0.0214)** (0.0343)** (0.0342)**
SIZE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
EMPLOYEES -2.7332 -2.7162 -2.7901 -2.7649 -3.9785 -3.9911
(0.8407)** (0.8408)** (0.9809)** (0.9809)** (1.4443)** (1.4428)**
INVESTORS -0.0064 -0.0060 -0.0067 -0.0060 -0.0056 -0.0055
(0.0032)* (0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Constant 0.1343 0.1315 0.1063 0.1022 0.1637 0.1631
(0.0251)** (0.0250)** (0.0288)** (0.0288)** (0.0338)** (0.0337)**
Observations 8602 8610 5898 5904 2476 2481
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.35 0.35
COUNTRY DUMMIES Yes
BRANCH DUMMIES Yes
Yes No No Yes
Yes No No
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is net
investment over total assets in the preceding period. For further information, see table 4. The EATR is calculated for
an assumed capital cost of 5%. The expected profitability of the project is approximated by the average pre-reform




This time, it does not make much sense to compare the coe¢ cients because the
scale of the two tax parameters di⁄ers. But, like in table (7), EATR term always
yields a slightly better ￿t, measured in standard errors. However, the values seem
too close to give a reliable answer to the question which model to prefer. Again
we also calculated the regression estimates for American and Asian subgroups,
without getting signi￿cant results. Assuming pro￿t rates of ten or twenty percent
instead of taking the pre-reform average pro￿tability did not change the results.
We sum up the results in tables 8 and 9 in
Result 8 The data yield very similar results for the discrete investment choice
model and the marginal investment choice model. These results do not allow
25deciding which of the two models perform better in describing the investment
data.
The reason why the two tax burden indicators perform so equally could be
that, ￿rst, the two are highly correlated, and second, that the tax law changes
in other countries do not generate enough data variation in order to di⁄erentiate
between the two.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we evaluate the German tax reform of 2000 with respect to its e⁄ect
on inward foreign direct investment. We deal with the identi￿cation problem by re-
ferring to the rather radical assumption that the aggregate e⁄ect of the tax reform
is equal to zero. Nevertheless, we ￿nd signi￿cant tax e⁄ects. The baseline regres-
sion indicates that a reduction in the e⁄ective marginal tax rate of 10 percentage
points increases net investment by 1 percentage point. Given an investment level
of around 7,5% and a pre-reform EMTR of around 52%, the elasticity of invest-
ment with respect to e⁄ective marginal taxation is approximately equal to ￿0;7.
In comparison to other empirical studies this estimate is rather at the bottom line,
but it should be recalled again that our results are based on an assumed aggregate
e⁄ect of zero.
We employed two distinct approaches to measure the tax impact on inward
FDI. The ￿rst de￿nes the pre-reform period (1997-1999) as the control group and
the post-reform period (2001-2003) as the treatment group. The second links
periodical variations in the investment process to periodical variations in the tax
incentive scheme. Both approaches yield virtually the same results.
The data con￿rm several predictions from standard tax theory. Pro￿table ￿rms
on average show a strong and signi￿cant tax impact while non-pro￿table ￿rms do
not. Firms with a high debt level are less tax-sensitive than ￿rms with a high
equity share. Tax considerations seem to be more relevant in branches in which
investment is likely to be cost-driven, like manufacturing, and less so in wholesale
trade activities and services, which are supposed to be complements to some foreign
production units. Geographic proximity plays a major role. We can show that the
tax e⁄ect is strong and signi￿cant for European investors while American and Asian
investments do not show any tax e⁄ect. Among Europeans, the investors from
countries with a common border with Germany show the strongest tax-sensitivity.
Besides those expected results, our data give some new and interesting insights,
which deserve further testing and research. First, among the pro￿table ￿rms, only
the just-above-zero pro￿table ￿rms show a signi￿cant tax e⁄ect. Under certain
assumptions, this could be interpreted as hint towards liquidity constraints. As a
26matter of fact, the reduction of the e⁄ective tax burden always has an income e⁄ect
and - under the assumption of imperfect capital market - this may induce ￿rms
which are cash-￿ ow constrained to increase investment. Analyzing this question
thoroughly is beyond the scope of this paper, though, and would require better
data. Second, ￿rms with a high fraction of non-￿nancial assets do react strongly
to the tax reform while others do less so. This is surprising because predictions
derived by standard tax theory said that those ￿rms would lose relative to others
from the tax reform. Third, our data fail to show signi￿cant di⁄erences between
the marginal investment choice model and the discrete investment choice model.
This may be due to the fact that our data sample is considerably reduced when
we compare these two models and that ￿rms with a higher pro￿tability (i.e. those
which are candidates to con￿rm the discrete investment choice model) do not show
any tax impact. In addition, the two tax rate measures under consideration are
highly correlated, so we would not expect great di⁄erences in the coe¢ cients or
standard errors. The problem is that the tax rate cut is equal for all ￿rms, so we
lack an approach to identify the impact of this feature of the tax reform, given
that we cleaned the time series from any aggregate impact.
What follows from our results for tax policy? First, and most important, tax
policy does matter. Tax policy-makers could learn from our data that lowering
the tax burden on investment has some bene￿cial e⁄ect on inward foreign direct
investment even though the aggregate business cycle might blur it. Note though
that we have to know the cost of the tax reform, i.e. the welfare loss due to
decreasing tax revenue, before stating whether this reform is part of an optimal tax
policy strategy or not. Second, our data are not suitable for answering the question
which of the two models - marginal choice versus discrete choice - is appropriate
to describe the investment process; therefore we cannot derive a conclusion on
whether a tax rate cut cum base broadening strategy is optimal or the opposite
is true. A related point is, third, that our data do not show any tax-sensitivity
for highly pro￿table MNEs. Thus, they question the assertion by Bond (2000)
saying that observable corporate tax policy is driven by highly pro￿table and tax-
sensitive MNEs choosing their location. We do show a strong and signi￿cant tax
e⁄ect for marginally pro￿table ￿rms. If the assumption is justi￿ed that ￿rms
with low pro￿tability have investment projects with low pro￿tability, this could
be interpreted as an argument in favour of reducing the cost of capital instead
of lowering the tax burden on intramarginal pro￿ts. Fourth, the data hint at
a concentration of tax competition between European countries, and even more
between countries with a common border.
To sum up, our analysis underlines the importance both of tax policy itself
and of tax policy research. We hope that this paper contributes to clarifying the
environmental conditions in which tax policy takes place. There are still many
27open questions, though, and further research with better data is required in order
to give sound advice to tax policy-makers.
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30Appendix: Data sources
FDI data
The Deutsche Bundesbank carries out annual full sample surveys on inbound and
outbound direct investment stocks based on the provisions of the German Foreign
Trade and Payments Regulation. Due to this legal regulation, foreign companies
with investments in Germany have to report selected balance sheet information
of their German subsidiaries. The balance sheet data are calculated using the
German accounting regulations. Similarly, German multinational companies have
to report the same information about their foreign a¢ liates. For an extensive
description of the database, see Lipponer (2003a) and Lipponer (2003b).
The data is available for the years 1989 to 2003. Time series for individual
companies are available for the years 1996 to 2003. In 2002, about 6,000 domestic
investors ￿led reports on around 22,000 foreign subsidiaries abroad. With respect
to inward FDI, in 2002 data are available for about 10,000 a¢ liates in Germany,
in which some 7,000 foreign investors had a participating interest.
For the purpose of our paper we used only the data on inbound FDI. In order
to create a balanced data set, we only use data from 1996 on and exclude all ￿rms
which do not have full coverage of the whole period 1996-2003. The balanced panel
dataset contains 2830 subsidiaries in Germany.
The investors are based in the following countries: France, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Italy, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Fin-
land, Austria, Switzerland, USA, Canada, South Korea and Japan. If a subsidiary
is owned by investors from di⁄erent countried we assumed that the home country
is the one where the investor with largest share in the subsidiary comes from. If
two or more investors are equal in size, we choose the one from the country which
comes ￿rst in alphabetic order.
The most important branches of activity in our data set are Manufacturing,
Wholesale, Holdings, Services to Companies and the Financial Services. We con-
centrate on incorporated non-public companies that have either the legal form of a
corporation (Aktiengesellschaft (AG)) or a limited liability company (Gesellschaft
mit beschr￿nkter Haftung (GmbH)).
Tax related data and other data
For the calculation of the economic depreciation rates in equation (10) we adopt
the assumptions reported in Spengel (2001): Intangible assets depreciate over a
period of 12.5 years, buildings over 53 years and machinery over 11 years.
To calculate Ai in equation (9), we assume a nominal interest rate of 10 percent
and an in￿ ation rate of 3.5 percent. These values are adopted from Devereux, Grif-
31￿th and Klemm (2002) who also provide the data on other countries￿depreciation
allowances and statutory tax rates.
The ￿i are taken from branch-speci￿c aggregate data of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank15 assuming that the a¢ liates held by foreign owners have the same tangible
capital structure as the industry average.
15Available online at:
http://www.bundesbank.de/stat/download/stat_sonder/statso6_2000_2002.pdf
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